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NOTES
CIVIL RIGHTS-MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION-REFUSING TO
RENT TO UNMARRIED COHABITANTS IS NOT UNLAWFUL MARITAL
STATUS DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE MINNESOTA HUMAN RIGHTS
ACT. State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
Layle French owned a two-bedroom house in Marshall, Minne-
sota, which he was attempting to sell.' While awaiting its sale, he
rented it to married couples and single persons.2 On February 22,
1988,' French agreed to rent the house to Susan Parsons."
Soon after, French determined that Parsons was likely to engage
in sexual relations with her fiance while living with him on the prop-
erty.5 On February 24, 1988, French told Parsons that he had reconsid-
ered and refused to rent the house because cohabitation 6 between un-
married men and women was contrary to his religious beliefs.7 French
was a member of the Evangelical Free Church and, as such, his reli-
gious convictions included the belief that it is sinful for unmarried
couples to engage in sexual relations or live together.8
When questioned by French, Parsons and her fiance neither indi-
cated nor denied that they intended to have sex on the property. 9 Even
I. State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn. 1990). French was selling the
property in Marshall because-he had purchased a house in the country. Id.
2. Id.
3. French advertised'the property from January to March 1988 as available for rent. Id.
4. Id. French also accepted a $250 security deposit from Parsons. Id. At this time, French
knew that Parsons intended to live with her fiance in the house. State ex rel. Cooper v. French,
No. C2-89-1064 (Minn. App. Oct. 31, 1989) (1989 WL 127867).
5. 460 N.W.2d at 3.
6. "'Cohabit' means to live together in a sexual relationship when not legally married." Id.
at 4 n.1 (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 259 (1980)
(New College Dictionary)).
7. Id. at 3-4.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 4. The record is unclear as to whether French had knowledge of any intended
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if French had been satisfied that the couple did not plan to engage in
sex on the premises, he still would have refused to rent to them because
he believed such a living arrangement constituted the "appearance of
evil." 10 He admitted he would have rented the house to Parsons had she
and her fiance been married.1
After French refused to rent the house, Parsons filed a charge of
marital status discrimination against French under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act (MHRA). 2 The Minnesota Department of Human
Rights investigated the matter and issued a complaint against French."3
An administrative law judge granted partial summary judgment in
favor of the department on the issue of liability.' 4 The judge found that
French violated the MHRA's prohibition of marital status discrimina-
tion 5 when he refused to rent the property because of Parsons' intent
to live there with her fiance.' After a hearing on the issue of damages,
the judge awarded Parsons a judgment for $368.50 in compensatory
damages and $400 for mental anguish and suffering. 7 The judge also
ordered French to pay a civil penalty of $300 to the state, and denied
French's motion for a trial de novo before the district court. 8
A Minnesota Court of Appeals panel affirmed that French dis-
criminated against Parsons and held that French's argument based on
the free exercise of religion provided no defense. 9 The Minnesota Su-
preme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that a landlord's
refusal to rent to an unmarried person because she would be living with
her fiance does not violate the MHRA.20 In addition, the court held
that a landlord's right to the free exercise of religion under the Minne-
sexual activity. Id.
10. Id.
I1. Id.
12. Id. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01 to .15 (West Supp. 1991).
13. 460 N.W.2d at 4.
14. Id.
15. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, subd. 2 (West Supp. 1991) provides:
It is unfair discriminatory practice:
1) For an owner [or] lessee ...
a) to refuse to sell, rent, or lease . . . any real property because of race, color,
creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to
public assistance, disability or familial status . . ..
16. 460 N.W.2d at 4.
17. Id.
18. Id. The judge refused to award punitive damages. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 11.
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sota Constitution 21 outweighs the interest of a tenant to cohabitate
with her fiance. 22 State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn.
1990).
While most of the issues involving the legal rights of unmarried
cohabitating adults have arisen fairly recently, the core obstacle to the
recognition of such rights has ancient roots. Cohabitation connotes sex-
ual relations23 and therefore is associated with fornication .2  Fornica-
tion is forbidden by the Bible 5 and may be one of man's oldest
crimes. 6 At one time in England, fornication was punishable by
death2 7 and prosecutions for fornication were common in the American
colonies. 8 The New England colonies imposed a number of penalties
against fornicators, including fines, public whippings, injunctions to
marriage, and forcing the violators to wear the letter "V" on their
clothing.29
Fornication and cohabitation remain crimes in a number of
states.3 0 In response to modern commentary criticizing the use of crimi-
21. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16, provides: "The right of every man to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed . . . nor shall any control of or
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted.
22. 460 N.W.2d at 11.
23. See supra note 6.
24. Fornication is defined as "sexual intercourse between unmarried people." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 894 (3d ed. 1981).
25. E.g., Acts 15:20 ("But that we write unto them, that they abstain from pollutions of
idols, and from fornication. ... ); 1 Corinthians 6:18 ("Flee fornication. Every sin that man
doeth is without the body; but he that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body.");
Galatians 5:19-21 ("Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these; Adultery, fornica-
tion, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry . . . they which do such things shall not inherit the
kingdom of God."); I Thessalonians 4:3 ("For this is the will of God, even your sanctification,
that ye should abstain from fornication.")
26. Green, Fornication: Common Law Legacy and American Sexual Privacy, 17 ANGLO-
AM. L. REV. 226 (1988).
27. Id. at 226.
28. Note, Fornication, Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 77 MICH. L. REV. 252, 253
(1978). From 1760 to 1774, 210 of the 370 criminal prosecutions in one Massachusetts county
involved charges of fornication. Id. at 253-54.
29. Green, supra note 26, at 227 (in Old English type-face, the letter "v" was to signify
"Vncleanness").
30. Note, supra note 28, at 254 n.4. (cites 15 states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia as having crimi-
nal fornication statutes as of 1978); see also id. at n.5 (16 states (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) had criminalized nonmarital co-
habitation as of 1978.).
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nal sanctions to punish victimless crimes, many states repealed these
statutes.3 1 In states that still have fornication and cohabitation statues,
the delicate political problems they pose to legislators, because of con-
flicting social values, make predictions regarding repeal of the statutes
difficult.3 2 The statutes, however, are seldom enforced by prosecutors.33
Criminal sanctions against unmarried sexual relations are perhaps
the most glaring example of how unmarried couples have historically
been denied the same legal treatment as married couples. They reflect
the state's perceived compelling interest in promoting the traditional
family.34 The law has traditionally preferred marriage because it is
viewed as promoting permanence and stability in the lives of individu-
als35 and society.3" Because "[c]ohabitation is an alternative to mar-
riage which displaces the traditional nuclear family," it is at odds with
fundamental policy designed to protect and preserve the family. 37
Cohabitation is also at odds with traditional views of morality, the
regulation of which has long been within the state's police powers.38
Courts have been unsympathetic to unmarried cohabitants, viewing
their relationships as immoral conduct.39 Similarly, the protection of
public health, as a legitimate state interest, serves as a basis for dis-
couraging extra-marital sexual relationships.40 The enforcement of laws
discouraging extra-marital sexual contact is presumed to decrease the
public health risk by reducing the spread of sexually transmitted
31. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabi-
tation. 1981 Wis. L. REV. 275, 277 (1981).
32. Id.
33. "District attorneys either refuse to prosecute cohabitors, or prosecute only those who are
suspected of other illegal conduct." Id. at 277-78.
34. Id. at 314.
35. Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of Unmarried People in American Law, 30
ARIZ. L. REV. 207, 217 (1988).
36. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). The Court characterized marriage as "the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization, nor
progress." Id.
37. Fineman, supra note 31, at 314. Laws prohibiting bigamy, polygamy, and homosexual
mariage have survived constitutional challenges in light of the state's interest in protecting the
family. Fineman, supra note 31, at 314.
38. Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961). "[Tjhe very inclusion of the category of
morality among state concerns indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the physi-
cal well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness
of its people as well." Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Note, supra note 28, at 299-300.
39. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (upheld the
firing of two cohabitating heterosexual library employees suggesting that proper moral conduct is
a bona fide occupational qualification), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978).
40. Note, supra note 28, at 299.
MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION
diseases.4
Recognition of these governmental interests in regulating the rela-
tionships of unmarried persons is expressed in a number of contexts in
which the law treats unmarried couples differently from married
couples. "' For example, some employee life and health insurance bene-
fits are payable only to formally married spouses,"' as are benefits for
survivors under Social Security.4 Other employment benefit programs
often require legal marriage in order for a spouse to participate.4
Under tort law, marriage is generally a prerequisite to bringing wrong-
ful death or loss of consortium claims for the tortiously caused death or
injury of a domestic partner."'
Similarly, unmarried couples are not entitled to the same recogni-
tion as married couples under property law. This is evidenced by laws
providing for the distribution of property by intestate succession, which
generally direct decedents' estates to pass to a formal spouse but not to
an unmarried partner.' 7 Nor, in the absence of a contract, do unmar-
ried partners generally have a right to property accumulated during the
meretricious relationship upon termination of that relationship. 8
41. Note, supra note 28, at 299. The argument is also made that the state has an interest in
preventing the birth of illegitimate children as they would be burdened by social stigma, lack of
financial support, and would be more likely to become a burden on the state than children born to
married couples. Note, supra note 28, at 299.
42. "American law treats cohabitants in a lopsided fashion. In dispensing economic benefits
and rights based on marital status, it ignores unmarried cohabitation. In imposing economic disa-
bility, it more often than not equates unmarried cohabitation with marriage." Blumberg, Cohabi-
tation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1137-38 (1981). See
also infra notes 43-77 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1076a (1988) (dependents of military personnel entitled to medi-
cal and dental benefits); 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2) (1988) (dependent defined as spouse, some former
spouses, children, and parents); see also Recent Developments, Protecting the Nontraditional
Couple in Times of Medical Crisis, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 220, 224 (1989).
44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(c (1988) (widow defined as the surviving wife of contributor,
married to him for a period of not less than nine months prior to his death). But see G.
DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW 51-53 (1979) (if the contributor dies in a
jurisdiction that recognizes common-law marriage, the surviving partner may qualify for benefits).
45. These include bereavement leave for death of a spouse or spouse's family member. See
Recent Developments, supra note 43.
46. Blumberg, supra note 42, at 1138. But see Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078
(D.N.J. 1980) (unmarried woman was allowed to bring loss of consortium claim for injuries to her
partner of 30 years).
47. See Jaff, supra note 35, at 215. Also, "certain kinds of property--co-op apartments in
New York, for example---cannot be transferred by will to a 'friend' without the approval of the
Board of Directors, though the same property can be bequeathed to a lawful spouse or child
without such permission." Jalf, supra note 35, at 215.
48. G. DOUTHWAITE, supra note 44, at 2 & 153-54. However, courts have recently been
1991]
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With state human rights legislation of the type at issue in French
being of relatively recent origin, early cases involving housing discrimi-
nation against unmarried persons centered around restrictive zoning or-
dinances. 49 In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas5° the United States Su-
preme Court upheld an ordinance which limited land use to single-
family dwellings, defining family as "[o]ne or more persons related by
blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single
housekeeping unit."5 1 The Court, applying minimum constitutional
scrutiny,5 2 found that the ordinance was reasonably related to the per-
missible governmental purpose of protecting "family values, youth val-
ues, and the blessings of quiet seclusion. a53 Because the Belle Terre
ordinance made an exception for unmarried couples, 4 the constitution-
ality of zoning out cohabitating couples was left unanswered.
In City of Ladue v. Horn,55 however, the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals upheld a decision enjoining an unmarried couple from occupying
their home in violation of an ordinance designating the neighborhood as
single family residential and limiting the definition of family to those
related by blood, marriage, or adoption.56 The court rejected the argu-
willing to enforce contract claims between cohabitants which deal with division of property should
the relationship end. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d
106 (1976) (landmark decision holding community property laws do not apply to unmarried
couples, but the parties may still be entitled to assets gained during their relationship based on the
theory of express or implied contract). It should be noted, however, that states considering
whether to recognize the property rights of unmarried cohabitants have addressed the issue in two
ways. "First, there are those states which refuse to deal with the area, declaring that public policy
prohibits legal protection of cohabitants' property rights. The second group of cases include those
that do not recognize cohabitants' rights per se but will enforce an express or implied contractual
relationship." Jennings, Unmarried Cohabitants: New Issues . . . New Answers . . . New
Problems, 8 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 47, 51 (1981).
49. Jaff, supra note 35, at 218.
50. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id. at 7-10. The ordinance was challenged on several grounds, including that it imper-
missibly interfered with the right to travel and the right to privacy and that it impermissibly
expressed social preferences. The Court rejected all of these arguments. Id. at 7.
53. Id. at 9. For a critique of the rational basis scrutiny as applied in Village of Belle Terre.
see Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REv.
563, 585-87 (1977).
54. 416 U.S. at 2. "A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking
together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be
deemed to constitute a family." Id.
55. 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. App. 1986).
56. Id. at 752. The ordinance defined family as "[olne or more persons related by blood,
marriage or adoption, occupying a dwelling unit as an individaul housekeeping organization." Id
at 747.
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ment that the household was the "functional and factual equivalent of
a natural family,"'5 7 stating "A man and woman living together, shar-
ing pleasures and certain responsibilities, does not per se constitute a
family in even the conceptual sense. To approximate a family relation-
ship, there must exist a commitment to a permanent relationship and a
perceived reciprocal obligation to support and care for each other."5 8
The court upheld the ordinance because it met its stated purpose of
promoting the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the city.59
Within the last several years, states have passed human rights leg-
islation of the type at issue in French, prohibiting discrimination based
upon marital status.6" The definition of marital status, however, is not
settled and in some jurisdictions is not sufficiently broad to protect un-
married couples.61 The general issue involved in interpreting these stat-
utes is whether marital status refers solely to the state of being married
or whether it also requires reference to the personal circumstances and
identity of the parties involved. Courts have reached conflicting
results.61
Some courts define marital status narrowly, holding that the denial
of housing to unmarried couples living together is not illegal under
57. Id. at 748. The couple had three children. Her children were 16 and 19, and his child
was 18. The two older children were university students who only lived in the house on a part-time
basis. Among other things, the couple shared a bedroom, paid household expenses from a joint
checking account, and ate together. Id. at 747.
58. Id. at 748.
59. Id. at 752.
60. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1986); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (West 1981);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-102(A) (1987); MINN. STAT.'ANN. § 363.03, subd. 2 (West Supp.
1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.222 (1990).
61. See Alley, Marital Status Discrimination: An Amorphous Prohibition, 54 FLA. B.J.
217 (1980).
62. Id. Courts have disagreed when interpreting statutory proscriptions of employment dis-
crimination based on marital status. See, e.g., Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.
Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1980) ("marital status" construed as referring only to employee's status of
being single or married); Thompson v. Board of Trustees, School Dist. No. 12, 627 P.2d 1229
(Mont. 1981) ("marital status" includes the identity and occupation of a person's spouse as well
as whether or not the individual has a spouse); Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State
Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 415 N.E.2d 950 (1980) (definition
of "marital status" limited to single, married, divorced, or widowed status); Thomson v. Sanborn's
Motor Express, Inc., 154 N.J. Super. 555, 382 A.2d 53 (1977) (fact that employer was enforcing
a "no relatives" policy did not constitute unlawful marital status discrimination on the grounds
that "marital status" was only the state of being married or single). Compare Washington Water
Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978)
(interpreted "marital status" broadly to permit a finding that an employer's antinepotism policy
was discriminatory). See also infra note 99.
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housing statutes prohibiting marital status discrimination.6" In McFad-
den v. Elma Country Club" an unmarried woman applied for member-
ship in a country club that included the right to own and occupy a lot
within the club.65 When the club discovered that she intended to live
with her lover, its board of directors rejected her application on the
ground that a club by-law provided that "no immoral practices shall be
permitted on Club property. '"66 The court decided that the state's statu-
tory prohibition67 against marital status discrimination "does not in-
clude discrimination against couples who choose to live together with-
out being married."68 A Maryland court held in Prince George's
County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc.69 that only legal marriage can bestow
a legally recognizable marital status.7 0 Therefore, rejection of an un-
married couple's application for membership in a cooperative housing
development did not constitute discrimination based on marital sta-
tus. 71 The court acknowledged the legislature's intent to send a public
policy message, through "procedural prerequisites for legitimating
'marriages,' . . . and the statutory condemnation of other relation-
ships," to encourage "the proverbial concept that more belongs to a
marriage than four bare legs in a bed." 72
Using similar reasoning, the Illinois Appellate Court in Mister v.
A.R.K. Partnership3 narrowly construed the Illinois Human Rights
Act's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of marital status, 74
holding that the prohibition does not include the refusal to rent to un-
63. See infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
64. 26 Wash. App. 195, 613 P.2d 146 (1980).
65. Id. at 197, 613 P.2d at 148.
66. Id. at 198, 613 P.2d at 148.
67. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.222 (1990) provides:
It is unfair practice for any person ... because of sex, marital status, race, creed, color,
national origin ... 2) To discriminate against a person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of a real estate transaction or in the furnishing of facilities or services in
connection therewith ...
id.
68. 26 Wash. App. 195, 205, 613 P.2d 146, 152 (1980). The court stated that the existence
of a statute criminalizing cohabitation at the time the marital status discrimination prohibition
was enacted indicated the legislature's intent that the prohibition was not to protect unmarried
cohabitants. Id. at 202, 613 P.2d at 150.
69. 49 Md. App. 314, 431 A.2d 745 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
70. Id. at 319, 431 A.2d at 748.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 197 Ill. App. 3d 105, 553 N.E.2d 1152 (1990).
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, paras. 1-102(A), 3-102(A) (1990).
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married cohabitants.7" The court focused on the state's criminalization
of fornication 7 and nonrecognition of common-law marriage to reach
its decision that protecting unmarried couples through a prohibition of
marital status discrimination "would contravene Illinois' strong public
policy in favor of strengthening and preserving the integrity of
marriage."'7
In contrast, some jurisdictions define marital status broadly
enough to protect unmarried cohabitants. This was the position of the
Alaska Supreme Court in Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com-
mission s in which the court concluded that the state's prohibition
against marital status discrimination7 9 includes the protection of the
rights of unmarried couuples. 80 The Foreman court was not faced with
the task of harmonizing the definition of marital status discrimination
with the prohibition of fornication because the Alaska Legislature had
recently repealed the fornication statute.8 1
In Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co.s" the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit construed
marital status discrimination in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act8 3 as
protecting an unmarried couple in a residential real estate transac-
tion.84 The court held that the refusal to aggregate an unmarried
couple's income, when a married couple's income would be aggregated,
for the purpose of a mortgage credit check was "precisely the sort of
discrimination prohibited by [the Act] on its face."8 " Hess v. Fair Em-
75. 197 III. App. 3d at 116, 553 N.E.2d at 1159.
76. Id. at 113-14, 553 N.E.2d at 1158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-8 (1987), as
amended by Pub. Act 86-490, § I, eff. Jan. 1, 1990, provides: "Any person who has sexual inter-
course with another not his spouse commits fornication if the behavior is open and notorious." The
court in Mister explained "the mere fact that unmarried couples ... attempted to rent apartments
is sufficient to satisfy the open and notorious requirement." 197 Ill. App. 3d at 115, 553 N.E.2d
at 1158.
77. 197 111. App. 3d at 115, 553 N.E.2d at 1158.
78. 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989).
79. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1986) provides: "It is unlawful ... (I) to refuse to sell, lease
or rent the real property to a person because of sex, [or] marital status.
80. 779 P.2d at 1203.
81. Id. at 1202. The court cited a legislative resolution that characterized the portion of the
code governing "crimes against morality and decency" as "vastly out of step with constitutional
and social development in recent decades." Id. (quoting S. Con. Res. 5, 1975 Alaska).
82. 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a) (1988) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discrimi-
nate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction (1) on the basis of
race, color . . . or marital status ... "
84. 605 F.2d at 569.
85. Id.
1991]
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ployment & Housing Commission86 followed Markham in interpreting
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. 87 An owner's re-
fusal to rent a duplex to an unmarried couple violated the Act despite
the owner's business practice "to require that each person of an unre-
lated couple separately qualify financially to rent the duplex, while re-
quiring that only one spouse of a married couple so qualify."88 The
court reasoned that the owner's financial interests would not be jeop-
ardized by requiring that the same standards be applied to both mar-
ried and unmarried couples, especially in light of the fact that the land-
lord could require each tenant to be personally liable for payment of
the rent whether they were married or not.89
Finally, in Munroe v. 344 E. 76th Realty Corp.90 a New York
court enjoined a landlord from evicting an unmarried couple despite a
provision in the lease requiring that only the party to the lease and his
spouse and children could use the apartment.9" The court explained
that the state's human rights legislation would be meaningless if a
landlord, who was prohibited from discriminating on the basis of mari-
tal status in selling or renting,92 could serve an eviction notice or fail to
renew the lease on the same discriminatory basis.93
A statute's failure to define marital status in only one obstacle
preventing equal access to housing for unmarried cohabitants. 94 The
legislation itself may be limited by its terms so that unmarried cohabi-
tants receive little or no protection.9"
86. 138 Cal. App. 3d 232, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1982).
87. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (West 1980) provides: "It shall be unlawful: (a) For the
owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against any person because of the race,
color, . . . [or] marital status . . . of such person."
88. 138 Cal. App. 3d 232, 235, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714.
89. Id. at 236, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
90. 113 Misc. 2d 155, 448 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
91. 113 Misc. 2d at 158, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
92. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, subd. 5 (a) (McKinney 1982).
93. 113 Misc. 2d at 157, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 390. But cf. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 59
N.Y.2d 733, 450 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1983), 463 N.Y.S.2d 428 (The court held that a landlord did
not discriminate against a tenant on the basis of marital status by attempting to evict her on the
grounds that she violated the lease by living with a man on the premises. The court observed that
the lease would have been violated without reference to marriage had the additional tenant been
an unrelated female. Therefore, the immediate family restriction in the lease was independent of
the tenant's marital status.).
94. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
95. For example, Colorado has a statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
marital status in any aspect of housing. This statute, however, does not "apply to or
prohibit compliance with local zoning ordinance provisions concerning residential re-
strictions on marital status." Oregon has a similar statute prohibiting marital status
662 [Vol. 13:653
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In State ex rel. Cooper v. French"6 the Minnesota Supreme Court
began its analysis by observing that Minnesota Human Rights Act
(MHRA),97 at the time of the alleged violation, did not contain a defi-
nition of the term marital status.98 Therefore, the court was forced to
define marital status to determine whether French's actions resulted in
a prima facie violation of the Act's provision against discrimination in
the housing context. 99 Considering the statute ambiguous, 100 the court
looked to legislative intent and public policy to determine its mean-
ing.101 The court had previously construed the term marital status by
looking "to the legislature's policy of discouraging fornication and pro-
tecting the institution of marriage."102
The majority observed that the state's fornication statute remained
a valid expression of public policy in light of a recent fornication prose-
cution.103 It also stated that when a couple is cohabitating, direct evi-
discrimination in selling, renting or leasing real property. But, this section does not
apply if "the application of this section would necessarily result in common use of bath
or bedroom facilities by unrelated persons of the opposite sex." Thus, these statutes
tend to take away with one hand much of what they have given with the other.
Jaff, supra note 35, at 218 (footnotes omitted) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502 (2) (1988)
and OR. REV. STAT. § 659.033 (3) (1987)).
96. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (Justice Yetka wrote the opinion for the majority).
97. See supra notes 12 and 15.
98. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01, subd. 24, (West Supp. 1991) as it currently exists
provides:
"Marital status" means whether a person is single, married, remarried, divorced,
separated, or a surviving spouse, and in employment cases, includes protection against
discrimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions or beliefs of a spouse or
former spouse.
99. 460 N.W.2d at 4. The court noted that previously it had construed the term "marital
status" in the context of employment discrimination. In Kraft, Inc. v. State ex rel. Wilson, 284
N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979), the court held that an employer's antinepotism policy violated the
prohibition against marital status discrimination because such a policy "could discourage similarly
situated employees from marrying" and lead employees to "forsake the marital union and live
together" in violation of Minnesota's fornication statute. Id. at 388. Also, in Cybyske v. Indepen-
dent School Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1984), the court upheld a narrow definition of
marital status discrimination by refusing to extend the definition to prohibit an employer from
making distinctions based on the identity or conduct of an employee's spouse.
100. 460 N.W.2d at 5. "The term 'marital status' is ambiguous because it is susceptible to
more than one meaning, namely, a meaning which includes cohabitating couples and one which
does not." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court cited the state's criminal fornication statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.34
(West 1987), and its treatment in Kraft, Inc. v. State ex rel. Wilson, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn.
1979), to illustrate this point.
103. 460 N.W.2d at 6. See State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. 1986) (high school
teacher prosecuted under the fornication statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.34 (West 1987), for
1991]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
dence of fornication is not required, as sexual relations may be inferred
from the nature of the relationship." 4 Therefore, "unequal treatment
based on cohabitation [is] not 'marital status' discrimination. 10 5
Continuing its analysis of the legislative intent, the court looked to
the definition of marital status in the MHRA,'0 6 which was enacted
after French's alleged violation.107 The language of that definition ad-
dressed only the status of an individual and not an individual's relation-
ship with another. 0 8 The court reasoned that the language of the stat-
ute specifically granting broader protection in employment cases
"constitutes legislative recognition that employment cases are funda-
mentally different from housing cases."' 0 9 It concluded, after an exami-
nation of the records of legislative hearings, that the MHRA was not
intended to protect unmarried couples in housing cases," 0 and, absent
express legislative guidance, the Act "will not be construed in a manner
inconsistent with this state's policy against fornication and in favor of
marriage.""'
After resolving the issue of statutory interpretation, the court un-
necessarily addressed French's claim that his religious liberty would be
infringed if the MHRA were applied against him. 1 2 The court rejected
the argument that French surrendered his right to free exercise of reli-
gion by entering into the housing market." 3 French's situation as a
landlord renting his former residence was distinguished from businesses
organized in the corporate form that may be more heavily regulated by
the state." 4 The court reasoned that the enforcement of the MHRA
against French would be tantamount to denying him the "basic right to
granting special favors and privileges to female students in exchange for sex).
104. 460 N.W.2d at 5-6.
105. Id. at 6.
106. Id. See supra note 98. This statutory definition was enacted in response to the Cybyske
decision. 460 N.W.2d at 6. See supra note 99.
107. 460 N.W.2d at 4 n.2.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 7.
I1l. Id. at 6. The court considered Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 197 Ill. App. 3d 105, 553
N.E.2d 1152 (1990), and Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska
1989), as analogous cases in which other jurisdictions considered housing discrimination against
unmarried couples and statutory prohibition against fornication. See supra notes 73-77 and ac-
companying text. The court in French reasoned that before it could extend the MHRA to protect
unmarried couples, the Minnesota fornication statute must be repealed. 460 N.W.2d at 7.
112. 460 N.W.2d at 8.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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earn a living."' 1 5
In analyzing French's religious liberty defense, the court limited
its decision to an interpretation of the Minnesota Constitution."' The
court cited the preamble's provision protecting religious liberty and
freedom of conscience, 17 and explained that the state may infringe
upon these rights only if they are "licentious" or "inconsistent with the
peace or safety of the state."' 8 The court ruled that the state failed to
make such a showing and held that "French must be granted an ex-
emption from the MHRA unless the state can demonstrate compelling
and overriding state interests."119
Under this analysis the court considered French's sincerely held
religious beliefs and the state's asserted interest in promoting public
access to housing.2 0 The court recognized the "preferred status" the
institution of marriage is afforded by the law, as evidenced in other
contexts' where cohabitating persons are not entitled to the same ben-
efits as married couples. 2 ' Regarding Minnesota's fornication stat-
ute, 12 3 the court reasoned that the state's interest in eliminating "perni-
cious discrimination" would not be served by applying the MHRA in
this situation, as there is nothing pernicious "about refusing to treat
unmarried cohabiting couples as if they were legally married" in light
of the state's interest opposing fornication and favoring marriage. 24
Considering its obligation to enforce a statute in the least restrictive
manner to accommodate religious liberty, the court concluded that it is
less restrictive to have Parsons abide by the fornication statute than to
force French to cooperate in its violation. 2 5 As the court analyzed the
115. Id. The court noted that French's need for rental income may be as basic as the need
for wage income. This same concern had directed the court's previous decision preventing discrim-
ination in the employment context. Id.
116. Id. "It is axiomatic that a state supreme court may interpret its own constitution to
offer greater protection of individaul rights than does the federal constitution." Id. (quoting State
v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1985)).
117. The preamble of the Minnesota Constitution provides: "We, the people of the state of
Minnesota, grateful to God for our civil and religious liberty, and desiring to perpetuate its bless-
ings and secure the same to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution."
118. 460 N.W.2d at 9 (quoting MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 16).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 10.
121. Id. Examples include employee health and life insurance benefits, intestate succession
statutes, and the marital communication privilege in the rules of evidence, Id.
122. Id.
123. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.34 (West 1987).
124. 460 N.W.2d at 10.
125. Id.
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situation, French was being punished not only for his religious beliefs,
but also for refusing to disregard the fornication statute."" Therefore,
the court rejected the state's argument that granting French an exemp-
tion would allow landlords to discriminate on religious grounds against
divorced, remarried, or single persons with children.' 27
The majority concluded by explaining the importance of funda-
mental values and institutions that have "served western civilization
well for eons.' 28 The court cautioned that before casting aside these
fundamental values, it "must pause and take stock of our present social
order," which it characterized as plagued by drug abuse, child abuse,
and children who are growing up without parental guidance.2 9 It ques-
tioned how any social improvement could be expected when the state
"itself contributes ... to further erosion of fundamental institutions
that have formed the foundations of our civilization for centuries."130
Therefore, the court held on both statutory and state constitutional
grounds that French did not act unlawfully in refusing to rent his house
to Parsons. 13'
Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Popovich asserted that not only
did French violate the MHRA, but also that the majority misconstrued
precedent, legislative history, public policy, and the facts of the case.132
He argued that the MHRA is to be "'construed liberally for the ac-
complishment of [its] purposes' "'" of preventing "'discrimination [i]n
employment [and i]n housing.' "'s The dissent also contended that
Minnesota precedent holds that discrimination against an individual on
the basis of with whom that individual lives constitutes marital status
discrimination. 35
126. Id.
127. Id. at 10-11.
128. Id. at 11.
129. Id. at n.6 (citation omitted).
130. Id. at n.7 (citation omitted).
131. Id. Justice Simmonett concurred, stating that the statutory construction was disposi-
tive. He did not reach the constitutional issue. Id. (Simmonet, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 11-12. (Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 12. (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.11 (West Supp. 1990)).
134. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.12 (West Supp. 1990)).
135. Id. (citing State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844
(Minn. 1985) (unlawful to question prospective employees about marital status, and the MHRA
did not violate the freedom of religion guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution); State ex rel.
Cooper v. Mower County Social Servs., 434 N.W.2d 494 (Minn. App. 1989) (unlawful to refuse
to hire applicant because she was pregnant and unmarried); State ex rel. Johnson v. Porter Farms,
Inc., 382 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. App. 1986) (marital status discrimination to fire employee because
he was not married to his girlfriend)).
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The dissent observed that the record did not indicate that Parsons
was going to have an illegal sexual relationship on the property.'"8 Be-
cause French admitted that he would have rented Parsons the house
had she been married, the dissent characterized French's refusal to rent
the house as discrimination based solely on Parsons' marital status as a
single individual living with an individual of the opposite sex.1"
In addition, the dissent noted that other jurisdictions disagree on
the issue of whether unmarried cohabitation falls within the definition
of marital status. 138 The dissent criticized the majority's selection of
precedent from other jurisdictions which it felt represented a minority
position.139
After rejecting the majority's reasoning regarding the discrimina-
tion claim, Chief Justice Popovich proceeded to analyze French's free
exercise of religion defense under a four-part test established in State
ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc. 40 The Sports & Health
Club test requires an evaluation of whether: (1) the religious beliefs are
sincerely held, (2) the "state regulation burdens the exercise of reli-
gious belief," (3) the state possesses a compelling or overriding interest
in the regulation, and (4) the regulation utilizes the least restrictive
means to accomplish its purpose. 4 1 The dissent considered the first
136. 460 N.W.2d at 13 (Popovich, C.J., disssenting). The dissent noted that the term "co-
habitation" may be used interchangeably with "living together." Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 520 (2d ed. 1934) and WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 218
(1976)). Also, because there was no direct evidence of a sexual relationship, the dissent concluded
that the fornication statute had no place in the resolution of the case at hand. Id. at 18.
137. Id. at 12-13.
138. Id. at 12.
139. Id. at 13. The dissent stated that the majority ignored the following precedents: Mark-
ham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (marital status discrimina-
tion to fail to aggregate an unmarried couples's income for purpose of a mortgage credit check);
Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989) (definition of marital
status includes unmarried couples); Hess v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 138 Cal. App.
3d 232, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1982) (unlawful marital status discrimination to refuse to rent a
duplex to an unmarried couple); Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130
Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (unlawful for owner of publicly assisted housing to evict on sole grounds of
unmarried cohabitation); Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754
(1973) (marital status discrimination includes refusal to rent to two female tenants who seek to
live together); Munroe v. 344 E. 76th Realty Corp., 113 Misc. 2d 155, 448 N.Y.S. 2d 388 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1982) (marital status discrimination to evict a tenant for allowing a man to live with
her); Yorkshire House Assocs. v. Lulkin, 114 Misc. 2d 40, 450 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1982) (landlord may not evict tenant on grounds that it would not have rented if it had known the
tenant was not married); Loveland v. Leslie, 21 Wash. App. 84, 583 P.2d 664 (1978) (marital
status discrimination to refuse to rent to two male roommates).
140. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985).
141. 460 N.W.2d at 14 (citing 370 N.W.2d 844, 851 (Minn. 1985)).
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part of the test satisfied because the sincerity of religious belief is sub-
jective in nature and French's sincerity was undisputed. " 2 The dissent
asserted that French failed, however, to establish that the regulation
unduly burdened his religious beliefs because he "voluntarily entered
into the rental marketplace . . . subjecting himself to potentially bur-
densome regulations .... ,143 The state's "interest in eradicating invidi-
ous discrimination" and its interest in promoting equal access to hous-
ing were viewed as compelling, especially because housing is a basic
human necessity. 1 4 This compelling interest would justify the burden
on French's religious beliefs.148 However, the burden must be "no more
burdensome than necessary to promote the secular interests."" Since
granting an exemption was the only alternative and would result in "a
complete abrogation of the state's goals of preventing invidious discrim-
ination," the dissent contended that there was no less restrictive means
of achieving the state's objectives. " " Finally, the dissent expressed its
opinion that "[d]iscrimination against unmarried individuals living
with members of the opposite sex is neither the cause or solution to
societal woes."1 4 8
The decision in French is more significant as a reflection of social
policy than as a matter of substantive law. The law favoring traditional
family relationships in this country is deeply rooted in moral precepts
which, in turn, are rooted in religious canons. The court devoted a ma-
jor portion of its opinion to a discussion of the landlord's religious
rights, even though that was unnecessary to the decision. Once the
court determined that the definition of marital status in the Minnesota
Human Rights Act did not protect unmarried cohabitants, there was
no reason to consider the issue of religious freedom.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 15. The dissent stated the MHRA "adopted a functional definition of public
accommodations that reaches various forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct," (quoting Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984)), and, when persons of particular religious
beliefs voluntarily enter into commercial conduct, they are subject to regulation binding on others
in that area of activity. Id. at 14-15 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)).
144. Id. at 16.
145. Id. at 19-20.
146. Id. at 19.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 20. The dissent also rejected French's argument that the MHRA violated his
protection under the federal equal protection and due process clauses because French failed to
specifically identify which fundamental rights the enforcement of the MHRA would jeopardize
and because French was afforded a full hearing before the penalty was assessed against him. Id.
668 [Vol. 13:653
MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION
The French opinion illustrates a reliance on a moral rationale 149
which was magnified when religious freedom was raised as a defense
against the operation of the anti-discrimination provision of the
MHRA. Thus, the court's emphasis on the landlord's religious freedom
represents a balancing of interests approach that curiously gave little
consideration to the tenant's claim that her civil rights had been
violated.
This opinion reflects the law's enduring attachment to a venerable
line of authority that favors the values associated with marriage and
traditional family life. Promotion of morality and stability in society is
often raised in support of the government's interest in encouraging the
traditional family. But while the ideal of the traditional family occupies
an important place in American culture, recent demographic trends re-
flect a marked increase in the number of unmarried couples living to-
gether.' 50 Extra-marital sexual relationships may still be viewed as im-
moral, or at least improper, by the majority of Americans, but the fact
that over 1.5 million unmarried couples cohabitate 15 1 undoubtedly re-
flects a change in social mores concerning such relationships. Even
when employing moral reasoning, courts should not lose sight of these
changing mores when considering competing values in our dynamic and
pluralistic society.
As a matter of substantive law, the French decision is important
because it adds contours to the continuing battle over the definition of
marital status used in anti-discrimination statutes. Several states have
enacted legislation similar to that at issue in French, and more are
likely to follow. Though Arkansas does not have a general civil rights
statute,151 some Arkansas statutes protect against discrimination based
on marital status. 53 This decision illustrates the problems that states
149. The court's inference of fornication from Parsons' intention to reside with her fiance
without direct evidence of sexual misconduct reflects this type of legal reasoning. See State ex rel.
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 6 (Minn. 1990).
150. Blumberg, supra note 42, at 1128-29. There were 1,560,000 unmarried couples
cohabitating as of 1980. This number increased by 200% from 1970 to 1980, and represents more
than 3% of all couples who reside together. Blumberg, supra note 42, at 1128-29.
151. Blumberg, supra note 42, at 1128.
152. The Senate passed S. 463, 78th Gen. Assembly (1991), an Arkansas civil rights bill
introduced by Sen. John Pagan. While in the house Public Health Welfare & Labor Committee,
Representative William Walker proposed an amended version which included protection against
marital status discrimination in housing and property transactions. Because the committee took no
action before the legislature adjourned, the bill died.
153. ARK. COVE ANN. § 4-87-104 (1987) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any creditor or
credit card issuer to discriminate between equally qualified individuals solely on the basis of sex or
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are likely to encounter when enacting and interpreting these types of
statutes.
As a representative of the nebulous meaning of marital status dis-
crimination and the social policy favoring the traditional family, the
French decision illustrates the dilemma that exists when balancing in-
dividual rights within the housing market. While the fabric of one's
religious convictions provides important refuge, necessary shelter is also
given by the roof over one's head.
Steven L. McConnell
marital status with respect to the approval or denial of terms of credit ... "; ARK. CODE ANN. §
23-66-206 (1987) provides: "The following are defined as unfair methods of competition and un-
fair ... practices in the business of insurance: .. .(7) (E) Refusing to insure, refusing to continue
to insure, or limiting the amount of coverage available to an individual because of the marital
status of the individual."
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